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Map 2. Approximate areas of influence of armed groups in Uvira, December 2015
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Preface: The Usalama Project
The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been mired 
in violence for two decades and continues to be plagued by dozens of 
armed groups. Yet, these groups—and how they interact with their 
social and political environment—remain poorly understood. The Rift 
Valley Institute’s Usalama Project (Usalama means ‘safety’ or ‘security’ 
in Swahili) is a field-based, partner-driven research initiative that aims 
to examine armed groups and their influence on Congolese society. 
While the first phase of the Usalama Project (2012–2013) focused on 
‘understanding armed groups’, the second phase (2015–2016) investigates 
‘governance in conflict0’. It is guided by a series of questions: How do 
armed actors affect conflicts related to public authority? And how, in 
turn, do local authorities shape patterns of armed group organization? 
The research also examines government policies and external interven-
tions aimed at reducing armed group activity.
The project takes a primarily qualitative approach, drawing on exten-
sive fieldwork by both international and Congolese researchers. Many of 
the interviews for this report were conducted on condition of anonymity. 
Therefore, identifying information is limited to a number assigned to 
each informant with a location and a date, e.g. Usalama II project inter-
viewee #75, Bukavu, 15 October 2015. However, where indicating the 
location is suspected to reveal the identity of the informant, no place is 
given to guarantee anonymity. In the course of the research, accounts 
of potentially disputed events were confirmed by multiple sources with 
first-hand knowledge of the events under discussion.
The ‘Governance in Conflict’ phase of the Usalama Project is part 
of the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), led by the 
University of Edinburgh’s Global Justice Academy and funded by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID). 
Summary
Located on the north end of Lake Tanganyika in the province of South 
Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the territory of Uvira 
has one of the highest concentrations of armed groups in the eastern 
Congo. Dozens of groups, often with no more than 50 fighters, reside 
in its mountains and the adjacent Ruzizi Plain. The presence of these 
groups has contributed to and is a result of militarization: the growing 
prominence of armed forces and the use of violence or threats of violence 
in non-military domains of social life. 
This report analyses militarization in Uvira and how it shapes the 
interplay between local conflicts, governance and armed mobilization. 
In particular, it looks at how armed forces influence and are influenced 
by conflicts related to customary power, security governance and local 
economic regulation. While Uvira has its own unique features, broadly 
similar processes of militarization can be found elsewhere in the eastern 
Congo. Uvira constitutes a microcosm of militarization, the study of 
which provides insights into the processes that drive violent conflict in 
the eastern Congo as a whole. 
The report focuses on two specific areas in Uvira: the Bafuliiru 
Chiefdom and the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom. Both have a plethora of armed 
groups, including village-based local defence forces. On the one hand, 
the presence of these groups is a result of power politics and military 
activities by regional and national factions. On the other, they are a 
product of local conflict dynamics and local competitions, with struggles 
for customary power being an important source of conflict. 
The resolution of local conflicts has been hampered by the involve-
ment of armed forces. Parties to a conflict tend to make use of armed 
groups—and sometimes members of the national armed forces—to 
reinforce their positions. This often leads to local security dilemmas, 
whereby opponents also feel pressure to liaise with an armed faction 
lest they become weaker.
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Security dilemmas are particularly pronounced where conflicts pit two 
communities against each other. Such conflicts between communities are 
commonly aggravated by frictions within communities, notably competi-
tions between elites—national and provincial politicians, businesspeople 
and officers in the national armed forces. Elites may impede the resolu-
tion of conflicts by encouraging parties to take an irreconcilable stance. 
They also sometimes provide rhetorical and financial support to armed 
groups, thereby exacerbating local conflicts.
Where insecurity is rampant and the state security services fail to 
protect the population, villagers (including demobilized Mai-Mai) have 
organized themselves into local defence forces. The role of these forces, 
which are tolerated by state security agencies, has become increasingly 
ambivalent. While they generally improve security, they also interfere 
with the work of the police and sometimes collaborate with bandits or 
rebel groups. Moreover, they are harnessed by local chiefs and villagers 
to settle scores and disputes. Local defence forces thus contribute to the 
further militarization of social life at the village level. 
The presence of so many armed groups in Uvira affects local 
governance profoundly, in particular because of their links with local 
authorities. Customary chiefs draw upon such groups to intimidate or 
overrule their opponents, including political and administrative authori-
ties who encroach on their spheres of influence. One domain where 
these dynamics are notably visible is cassiterite1 mining in the Bafuliiru 
Chiefdom, where customary chiefs have continued to exercise control, 
in part through support from local defence forces. 
By enabling local authorities to use coercion, the presence of armed 
groups damages the quality of local governance. Bad governance, in turn, 
creates fertile ground for conflicts, including the contestation of positions 
of authority. This is especially the case in the conflict surrounding the 
throne of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom, which has been aggravated by discon-
tent with the current chief’s mode of governing.
1  Cassiterite is a mineral, tin dioxide, which is the main ore of tin.
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In order to sustainably demilitarize Uvira, it is necessary to defuse 
conflicts related to customary authority, weaken armed groups and their 
civilian support networks, and improve security management and regula-
tion of local defence forces. To this end, it is important to recognize 
and address the adverse role sometimes played by politicians, business-
people and local authorities in armed mobilization. It is also essential to 
improve the governance of both customary authorities and the security 
services, in order to reduce incentives for citizens to solicit armed groups 
to provide security, dispute resolution and other public services. 
1. Introduction
Uvira territoire (a sub-provincial division) in South Kivu has periodically 
been a hotbed of armed activity since the Congo’s independence in 1960. 
Uvira was the cradle of the Simba rebellion in the early 1960s and the first 
territory occupied by the regional rebel coalition which ousted President 
Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. During the First and Second Congo Wars 
(1996–2003), a devastating period of violence that drew in a vast array 
of armed forces from neighbouring countries, the area was inundated 
with armed groups generically labelled ‘Mai-Mai’. Ever since, Uvira has 
witnessed continual armed group activity. 
The transition period (2003–2006) that followed the adoption of the 
final peace agreement failed to bring an end to armed mobilization, 
although it initially reduced the number of armed groups. During and 
after large-scale military operations between 2009 and 2012, new groups 
sprang up, while others stepped up their activities. This period also 
witnessed the re-emergence of armed, village-based local defence forces, 
which are especially numerous in isolated mountain areas. In contrast to 
present-day Mai-Mai groups, local defence forces have no anti-govern-
ment agenda and generally collaborate with the national army.
In mid-2015, more than 20 Congolese and two foreign armed 
groups operated in Uvira, along with scores of local defence forces.2 
 This report examines the processes underlying the proliferation of these 
armed groups. It analyses how the presence of these groups affects and 
is affected by local conflicts and governance. To that end, it studies two 
cases of conflict related to customary power: struggles over the leader-
ship of the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom; and conflict over succession to the 
throne in the Bafuliiru Chiefdom. 
Both of these conflicts reveal the high stakes surrounding the control 
of customary authority in Uvira. They also highlight the frictions between 
2  Centre Indépendant de Recherches et d’Études Stratégiques au Kivu (CIRESKI), 
‘Cartographie des groupes armés’. Unpublished document, Uvira: CIRESKI, July 2015.
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customary chiefs and other components of the local administration. Such 
conflicts compound the challenges of local governance and economic 
regulation, as cassiterite mining in the Bafuliiru Chiefdom illustrates. 
The involvement of armed groups, including local defence forces 
closely related to customary chiefs, has a further detrimental effect on 
governance, causing it to be erratic and skewed towards supporting 
particular interests. This especially applies where armed groups inter-
fere with the work of local authorities and state services, e.g. when local 
defence forces hinder the work of the police.
BOX 1. THE BAFULIIRU AND RUZIZI PLAIN CHIEFDOMS
Uvira is a vast territory that is home to numerous towns and three customary 
chiefdoms—the Bafuliiru, Ruzizi Plain and Bavira. These chiefdoms were 
founded by a royal decree adopted by the Belgian colonial authorities in 1928. 
A chefferie (chiefdom) is ruled by a mwami (paramount customary chief). 
The mwami has both an administrative position, as head of a collectivité (local 
government unit), and a customary position, as head of a chefferie. This dual 
function is reflected in the designation collectivité-chefferie, an entity that exists 
alongside a collectivité-secteur (sector) headed by an appointed administrator 
instead of a mwami. 
Chiefdoms are subdivided in groupements governed by customary chiefs 
(chefs de groupement) who are appointed by the paramount chief. Groupements are 
subdivided in localités (localities or villages) which are also ruled by customary 
chiefs. 
The Bafuliiru Chiefdom is named after its ruling ethnic group.* It has five 
groupements: Muhungu, Kigoma, Runingu, Itara–Luvungi and Lemera, which is 
home to the chiefdom’s seat in the village of Lemera. Most of the groupements 
straddle the Moyens and Hauts Plateaux, the middle-range and higher altitude 
mountains of the Mitumba mountain chain. One groupement, Itara–Luvungi, 
stretches far into the adjacent Ruzizi Plain, which borders Burundi and Rwanda. 
The Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom consists of four groupements: Kabunambo, 
Kakamba, Kagando and Luberizi, which hosts the chiefdom’s administrative seat 
located in the village of Luberizi. Until the 1970s, it was known as the Chiefdom 
of the Barundi, after the ethnic group of its ruling dynasty. Adjacent to the Ruzizi 
Plain Chiefdom are several important cités (towns that are not ruled by customary 
leaders), notably Sange and Kiliba, which cover a substantial part of the Plain. 
The Bafuliiru Chiefdom is largely inhabited by the Bafuliiru, although in 
the Plateaux there are also groups of Banyindu, Banyamulenge and Batwa. 
Furthermore, bordering the chiefdoms of Ngweshe and Kaziba, the Itara–Luvungi 
groupement has a sizeable presence of Bashi. Bafuliiru similarly constitute the 
majority of the inhabitants of the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom, living intermingled 
with Barundi and a small number of Banyamulenge. Additionally, significant 
numbers of Bafuliiru live in the city of Uvira, which is located a short distance 
away from Bujumbura, the capital of Burundi. Due to decades of migration and 
displacement, the territory of Uvira is also inhabited by many other groups.
* This ethnic group is also referred to as Bafulero or Bafuliro. The spelling ‘Bafuliiru’, 
however, is preferred by the Bafuliiru themselves as it better reflects pronunciation of this 
name in the group’s own language.
2. A history of conflict
The writing of history can be both a site and a cause of conflict. This is 
no different in Uvira, where contested interpretations of history are at 
once a cause and effect of conflicts. What aggravates these contestations 
is ‘reification’, or the process whereby abstract assumptions become 
understood as concrete realities. This often implies that the historical 
origins of social phenomena become obscured and are instead taken as 
natural assumptions.
A classic example is ethnicity. In the precolonial era, communities in 
Uvira did not constitute sharply delineated groups defining themselves 
primarily in ethnic terms. Moreover, different subgroups or clans could 
be absorbed into others. For example, the origins of the Bazige (or 
Bahungu) lie in present-day Burundi but they gradually became part of 
the Bafuliiru, living in present-day Congo.3 
Today, this history of fluidity seems all but forgotten. In contem-
porary narratives, ethnic groups are portrayed as having existed since 
time immemorial. It was, however, only during the colonial era that the 
boundaries of identity, territory and authority hardened. Current repre-
sentations and related claims of ethnicity therefore should be treated 
with caution.
The colonial era: from fluidity to fixing
One of the most contested episodes in Uvira’s history relates to the 
arrival and evolution of the Barundi in the Ruzizi Plain. In the second half 
of the nineteenth century, Kinyoni, who was a sub-chief of Burundian 
king Mwezi Gisabo, established himself on the right bank of the Ruzizi 
River, following earlier movements by his grandfather, Ntorogwe. In 
the absence of international boundaries, Kinyoni’s arrival is difficult to 
qualify as immigration. At the time, the zone of Uvira was controlled by 
3 Bosco Muchukiwa, Territoires ethniques et territoires étatiques. Pouvoirs locaux et conflits 
interethniques au Sud Kivu (R.D.Congo), Paris: l’Harmattan, 2006, 16–18.
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the Swahili-Arab trader-ruler Rumaliza and formed a transit area of the 
trading routes linking the Congo to Africa’s east coast.4
The area where Kinyoni and his followers arrived was not inhabited 
by Bafuliiru, who instead lived on the mountain slopes. Yet, some Fuliiru 
chiefs, to whom the Rundi leaders started to pay tribute, considered 
the Ruzizi Plain as belonging to their sphere of influence. In the 1890s, 
a number of Fuliiru chiefs fled the arrival of the colonizers, including a 
band of mutineers from the colonial army. This prompted Rundi chiefs, 
capitalizing upon their favoured status with the colonial authorities, to 
occupy the vacated zones. This expansionism provoked hostility from 
Fuliiru chiefs, culminating in clashes in 1920.5
While current practice ascribes these clashes to ethnic animosities, 
at the time, none of the groups involved had formed monolithic entities 
defining themselves strongly in ethnic terms. Rather, frictions in this 
era predominantly pitted different chiefs and their respective followers 
against each other. These chiefs could also be from the same group. In 
fact, clashes between Fuliiru chiefs were more frequent than between 
Fuliiru and Rundi chiefs.6 
Increased contact between Bafuliiru and Barundi also led to integra-
tion and mutual adaptation—through inter-marriage, friendship pacts 
and economic exchange. Contact intensified when large numbers of 
Bafuliiru descended from the mountain slopes into the valley from the 
1920s onward. Ultimately, this tipped the demographic balance, which 
reinforced the Bafuliiru’s claims to political leadership over the Ruzizi 
Plain.7
These claims were partly a result of the system of customary gover-
nance developed by the colonial authorities. Within the colony, the 
administrative sphere of statutory law and appointed administrators 
4 Muchukiwa, Territoires ethniques, 22–25; 53–55.
5 Jacques Depelchin, ‘From Pre-capitalism to Imperialism: A History of Social and 
Economic Formations in Eastern Zaire (Uvira Zone, c. 1800–1965)’, PhD dissertation, 
Stanford University, 1974, 84–88; Muchukiwa, Territoires ethniques, 23–25.
6 Depelchin, ‘From Pre-capitalism to Imperialism’, 91–96.
7 Depelchin, ‘From Pre-capitalism to Imperialism’, 34–35 and 91–92.
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was monopolized by Europeans. Local participation in governance was 
restricted to customary chiefs, whom the colonizers considered to repre-
sent well-delineated ethnic groups.8 Following customary law, chiefs 
were given jurisdiction over a wide range of communal and family affairs, 
including inheritance, marriage, and minor infractions and conflicts. 
They were also recognized as the custodians of the land belonging to the 
ethnic group from which they hailed. 
In this way, access to land and local political representation was 
dominated by customary rulers representing particular ethnic groups. As 
a result, ethnicity became a guiding principle of local social and political 
organization. Groups not granted a customary chiefdom were disadvan-
taged because they were excluded from local governance and did not 
have access to land of their own. This exclusion promoted friction where 
various ethnic groups lived intermingled but customary rulers came only 
from one group, as in the Ruzizi Plain. 
Another source of conflict created by the colonial system of local 
governance was the dual position of customary chiefs in the colonial 
state, which created tensions between the administrative and customary 
domains. On the one hand, chiefs had a relatively autonomous power 
base, as the communities they governed recognized them as legitimate 
rulers based on customary principles. On the other, chiefs ultimately 
depended on the colonial state, which meant they had to collaborate with 
unpopular measures such as taxation and forced labour to maintain their 
position. Thus, chiefs were caught in a balancing act that often brought 
them into conflict with colonial administrators and caused them to act 
against the interests of their subjects.
8 Mahmood Mamdani, ’Understanding the Crisis in Kivu: Report of the CODESRIA 
Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo September, 1997’, report submitted 
to the General Assembly of the Council for the Development of Social Research in 
Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal, 14–18 December 1998, Centre for African Studies, 
University of Cape Town, 20 November 1998.
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Post-independence rebellion
The years following the Congo’s independence in 1960 were extraordi-
narily turbulent in Uvira. Large-scale political transformations, including 
the organization of elections, unleashed vigorous power struggles. 
Among the Bafuliiru, for instance, a newly emerging group of political 
leaders tried to curb the power of customary chiefs, who were blamed 
for their complicity with the colonial regime.9 
A driving force in this political agitation was the Fuliiru politician 
Moïse (or Musa) Marandura, a member of the provincial parliament of 
Kivu. When Kivu’s government was overthrown by radical nationalists at 
the end of 1960, Marandura tried to seize the occasion to further his own 
political ambitions. Afraid of the anti-establishment atmosphere, both 
the Fuliiru and Rundi paramount chiefs fled to Burundi. Their departure 
allowed Marandura to become acting head of both chiefdoms. 
After only a few weeks, in April 1961, the Fuliiru chief, Simba Nyamu-
gira Henri, returned and resumed his position. He immediately dismissed 
all administrative personnel and the new chefs de groupement who had been 
appointed by Marandura. A few days later, Bafuliiru in the Ruzizi Plain 
attacked Barundi and their belongings, including livestock, an episode 
thereafter known as the guerre de chèvres (war of goats). 
Marandura played a crucial role in these events. Deprived of rule over 
the Bafuliiru Chiefdom, he now laid claim to that of the Barundi, casting 
doubt on their right to rule based on their alleged status as foreigners 
who had usurped the Bafuliiru’s ancestral grounds. This indicates that 
inter-community tensions between Bafuliiru and Barundi in this era were 
driven to a large extent by intra-elite power struggles within the Fuliiru 
community, notably the ambition of Marundura and his followers to take 
over from customary chiefs, whose rule they considered an anachronism. 
At the end of 1963, the protest movement led by Marandura linked up 
with the Conseil national de libération (CNL, National Liberation Council), 
a revolutionary movement in exile that aimed to oust the Congolese 
9 This section draws on Benoît Verhaegen, Rébellions au Congo. Tome 1, Brussels/
Leopoldville: CRISP, IRES and INEP, 1966, 265–279.
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government. From its eastern base in Bujumbura, the CNL started 
recruiting, organizing and training for a large-scale rebellion. 
In May 1964, the newly forged rebel army, led by Fuliiru commander 
Louis Bidalira, occupied the town of Uvira. The key to this military 
success was, in part, a sense of invincibility among the combatants, 
which they acquired via rituals with water (mai or mayi in Swahili), which 
they believed rendered the body untouchable by bullets. 
After the fall of Uvira, the Simba or Mulelist rebellion (as it became 
known) rapidly expanded to other parts of the Congo. Its successes, 
however, would only be short-lived. In 1967, a coalition of the Congo-
lese army and foreign mercenaries regained control over most of the 
rebel strongholds. They were aided by a network of local auxiliaries (or 
militants-combatants) recruited from among the population, who provided 
intelligence and served as guides to the army. Both ex-Mulelists and 
former militants-combatants would take up arms again during the Congo 
Wars, this time fighting a common enemy. 
The Congo Wars (1996–2003) and the aftermath
In the 1980s, intercommunity tensions in Uvira intensified, partly as a 
result of changes in the laws governing nationality. These tensions pitted 
groups labelling themselves ‘autochthones’, or natives, against ‘Rwando-
phones’ (speakers of Kinyarwanda and Kirundi such as the Barundi), 
who were portrayed as foreigners and immigrants. The situation deterio-
rated at the start of the 1990s, when political competition accelerated due 
to an attempted transition to multi-party democracy.10
In 1991, a census was held in the Ruzizi Plain to identify nationals. This 
effort ended in irregularities, as Barundi were excluded from identifica-
tion. Moreover, a mass of Fuliiru youth assembled in front of the house 
of the mwami of the Barundi chanting, ‘Ndabagoye, Ndabagoye, obwami 
bwamala’ (Ndabagoye [the name of the mwami], your reign is finished).11 
10 Mamdani, Understanding the Crisis in Kivu.
11 Usalama II project interviewee #14, Mutarule, 14 April 2014. 
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Fleeing to Burundi, Chief Ndabagoye was subsequently suspended, a 
decision based on accusations of nationalité douteuse (doubtful nationality). 
In 1993 and 1994, unrest intensified with the arrival of tens of thousands 
of Burundians and Rwandans fleeing the civil wars in their countries. The 
refugees were hosted in 11 camps along the Ruzizi River, living intermin-
gled with soldiers of the former Hutu-dominated Rwandan government 
army and allied Interahamwe militias, which had been involved in the 
Rwandan genocide. Fearing renewed military activity by these troops, 
the Tutsi-led regime in Kigali devised a scheme to invade and forcibly 
shut down the camps. To that end, it assembled a mixed regional and 
Congolese insurgent coalition, which also harboured wider ambitions 
for regime change in the country then known as Zaire.
On 18 October 1996, the Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération 
du Congo–Zaïre (AFDL, Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Libera-
tion of Congo–Zaire), the vanguard of which had by then infiltrated the 
mountains of Uvira, launched an assault on the Ruzizi Plain, engaging in 
systematic attacks on the refugee camps. This signalled the formal start 
of the First Congo War.
In reaction to the AFDL offensive, youths mobilized in the Ruzizi Plain 
to stop the advance of what was perceived to be a foreign occupation 
force. They were supported by customary chiefs and former Mulelist 
combatants, who arranged for healers or seers to immunize them against 
bullets, using potions and rituals with water (mai) similar to those the 
Simba rebels had used. Thereafter these groups came to be known as 
Mai-Mai. 
Mai-Mai resistance did not last long. The AFDL soon convinced 
these groups that liberating Zaire from the long reign of the autocratic 
Mobutu Sese Seko was a common interest. Furthermore, one of the 
AFDL leaders was the locally well-known Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a 
former Simba rebel who continued his revolutionary struggle in Fizi 
until the early 1980s. But not all Mai-Mai leaders were convinced and 
some thus continued resisting the AFDL, even after the latter’s takeover 
in Kinshasa in 1997. From August 1998 onward, this group was joined by 
scores of Mai-Mai combatants who re-mobilized to resist the invasion of 
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yet another foreign-backed rebel movement, the Rassemblement congolais 
pour la démocratie (RCD, Congolese Rally for Democracy), supported by 
both Rwanda and Uganda. 
During the Second Congo War, when the RCD occupied large swathes 
of the eastern Congo, attempts were made to reunite and coordinate 
the half dozen or so Mai-Mai groups operating in Uvira. However, key 
Mai-Mai leaders in the Bafuliiru Chiefdom, including ex-Mulelist Louis 
Bidalira and the brigade commanders Kayamba Kabugo and Jeannot 
Ruharara, continued to act with varying degrees of independence. 
Moreover, some Mai-Mai battalion commanders, such as Abduhramane 
Matata Lipanda (aka Abdou) and Mwenyemali, progressively detached 
themselves from their superiors. Meanwhile, yet other leaders operated 
in the Bavira Chiefdom, such as Baudouin Nakabaka and the ex-Mulelist 
leader Zabuloni Rubaruba. 
Various factors explain these divisions between Mai-Mai leaders, 
including struggles over power and resources, inter-ethnic and inter-clan 
tensions, and efforts by the RCD to divide the Mai-Mai. At the end of 
2000, the RCD launched a campaign to convince Mai-Mai combatants to 
rally to their side. Scores of troops, including Bede Rusagara, descended 
from the mountains to join them. After six months of training from 
Rwandan military instructors, they were redeployed as local defence 
forces tasked with guarding security in villages and towns in order to 
back up the RCD’s military wing.
In the Ruzizi Plain, some of these forces operated under the chief of 
the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom, Floribert Nsabimana Ndabagoye, who had 
retaken power in 1996 and was said to be allied to the RCD.12 In the 
memory of many Bafuliiru, Ndabagoye tried to use these forces—who 
dressed in yellow and were known as Majaunets—for private purposes, 
in particular to settle scores and repress opponents.13 A similar dynamic, 
whereby customary authorities harness local defence forces to reinforce 
12 Recall that only five years earlier, in 1991, Chief Ndabagoye of the Barundi had fled 
from Uvira to Burundi.
13 Usalama II project interviewees #7, Luberizi, 12 April 2014; #9; Luberizi, 12 April 2014.
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their own power position, would also be manifest in later episodes of 
local defence mobilization.
The peace agreement marking the formal end to the Second Congo 
War in 2003 heralded the start of a transitional period (2003–2006) that 
would last until the organization of general elections. The signatories 
agreed to divide positions in the institutions of government and, at a 
later stage, to integrate their troops into a new national army, the Forces 
armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC, the Armed Forces 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
In Uvira, existing Mai-Mai brigades were initially mixed with locally 
deployed RCD units. In a second phase starting in 2005, the fighters of 
these units were sent to different training centres in order to be further 
mixed and redeployed in new units. These processes unfolded erratically, 
as both Mai-Mai and RCD leaders tried to retain maximum control over 
their fighters. Moreover, many of the Mai-Mai commanders who operated 
autonomously were reluctant to be placed under the command of either 
RCD or other Mai-Mai officers. Additionally, Mai-Mai from all groups felt 
that the RCD were favoured in the distribution of ranks and positions. 
While many Mai-Mai officers eventually joined the FARDC, some 
resisted integration for years, for example, Zabuloni. Others integrated 
but returned to Uvira in later years, either on medical or extended leave 
or as deserters. Failing to obtain good positions in the FARDC and often 
reluctant to operate far from their former strongholds, these officers had 
little motivation to continue serving in the army. Some among this group 
would return to the bush or join local defence forces, often recruiting 
from among the thousands of unemployed, demobilized fighters who 
stayed in Uvira. This multitude of demobilized men and women left to 
fend for themselves is one of the many legacies of the Congo Wars that 
have sown the seeds for further armed mobilization. 
3. Continuing armed mobilization 
The emergence of new armed groups in the post-transition era (2006 to 
the present) has been driven by several factors.14 Crucially, the logic of 
power-sharing has created incentives to continue armed mobilization, 
allowing it to be translated into access to positions in the state apparatus 
or in wider political and economic influence. Regional factors have also 
played a role, with foreign and foreign-backed armed groups continuing 
to operate in the eastern Congo. A final factor is conflicts related to 
positions of local authority, land and forms of identification. 
In Uvira, post-transition remobilization has occurred in various waves. 
First, the Amani peace conference, held in Goma in 2008, created incen-
tives for former armed group commanders and combatants to organize 
themselves into new armed groups or enhance their visibility. Hoping to 
access the promised benefits, including positions in the national army, 
several armed groups in Uvira stepped up activity.15 Second, military 
integration processes and operations in 2009–2010 induced changes in 
local power constellations and created insecurity, which promoted both 
Mai-Mai mobilization and the rise of local defence forces. In 2011–2012, 
further turbulence was generated by the general elections and the 
emergence of local offshoots of the North Kivu based rebellion of the 
M23 (Mouvement du 23 mars, or the March 23 Movement). In the same 
period, conflicts related to customary authority intensified, giving further 
impetus to armed activity.
14 See the findings of the first phase of the Usalama Project: Jason Stearns, Judith 
Verweijen and Maria Eriksson Baaz, The National Army and Armed Groups in the Eastern 
Congo. Untangling the Gordian Knot of Insecurity, London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013.
15 ADEPAE, Arche d’Alliance, RIO and Life & Peace Institute, Au-delà des ‘groupes armés’. 
Conflits locaux et connexions sous-regionales. L’exemple de Fizi et Uvira (Sud-Kivu, RDC), Uppsala: 
Life & Peace Institute, 2011, 66–68.
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CNDP integration and the Kimia II operations
In 2009, the Congolese army launched Kivus-wide military operations 
against the Rwandan Hutu rebels of the Forces démocratiques de libération du 
Rwanda (FDLR, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). These 
operations followed on the heels of the integration of the Tutsi-led rebel 
group Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP, National Congress 
for the Defence of the People) and a few other armed groups into the 
FARDC as part of a surprising, sudden peace deal between Kinshasa 
and Kigali. Both CNDP integration and the subsequent military opera-
tions contributed to remobilization in Uvira, fostering the resurgence of 
Mai-Mai groups and local defence forces. 
Given that the CNDP integrated from a position of strength—not 
least due to its connections in Kigali—it came to dominate the national 
armed forces based in the Kivus.16 This reactivated antagonism towards 
Rwandophones among former Mai-Mai fighters, both within and outside 
the army. In April 2009, Fujo (a former Mai-Mai officer and the son of 
the Mulelist and Mai-Mai leader Zabuloni Rubaruba), who had previ-
ously served as deputy battalion commander in the 109th brigade of the 
FARDC, attacked the city of Uvira. Allegedly, his remobilization was 
encouraged by a handful of Fuliiru politicians and businesspeople. Not 
only did they hope this would guarantee them enhanced local influ-
ence but they also sympathized with the Mai-Mai ideology of resistance 
against Rwandophones and their allies, who were seen to include the 
government in Kinshasa.17 
After the attack, Fujo and his group—no more than a few dozen 
combatants—continued their activities in the Moyens Plateaux in Uvira. 
Despite their small size, this group built up significant influence.18 In 
16 Jason Stearns, From CNDP to M23. The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo, 
London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012.
17 Usalama II project interviewee #2, Bukavu, 26 March 2011. 
18 At the start of 2013, after the death of his father, Fujo left the bush to negotiate his 
surrender. In 2014, however, he returned to the bush because he was dissatisfied with 
the process. In the course of 2015, new negotiations were initiated, leading Fujo and his 
combatants to regroup in Uvira under the supervision of the FARDC.
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part, this was gained through collaboration with the Burundian rebel 
group Forces nationales de libération (FNL, National Liberation Forces) and 
the FDLR; Fujo maintained a commercial relationship in the cannabis 
trade with the latter.19
Collaboration between the FDLR and Mai-Mai forces was not new. 
During the Second Congo War, some Rwandan Hutu combatants who 
had been dispersed from the refugee camps after the AFDL invasion 
returned to the east. In Uvira, these combatants (who would eventually 
found the FDLR) started to collaborate with Mai-Mai groups in the fight 
against their common enemy, the RCD. During the transition period, 
what was now the FDLR remained in its areas of operation in the east.
From 2005 onward, a growing number of FDLR fighters, their families 
and other Rwandan refugees established themselves in the Mulenge 
area in the Moyens Plateaux. This group developed numerous revenue-
generating activities, including agriculture and trade in cannabis and 
cassiterite, which enabled them to become a significant economic force. 
The FDLR also integrated socially. As an inhabitant of Mulenge says, 
‘Some of our women married them. Their children were in all our schools. 
There was a Catholic church led by a Hutu deacon … and their women 
came to our hospital to give birth.’20 At the same time, the presence of the 
FDLR was considered oppressive: they took from the taxes levied at the 
market, extorted goods, and, in the face of the absence - or passivity- of 
the state security forces, acted as both police and army. As a member of 
the lubunga (the council of the wise) of the Bafuliiru says, ‘The mwami 
had effectively lost control over a part of his chiefdom.’21
This would change when the FARDC dislodged the FDLR from 
the Moyens Plateaux as part of military operations known first as Kimia 
(Silence) II and then from January 2010 onward as Amani Leo (Peace 
Today). Trying to avoid casualties, the FDLR withdrew to the Itombwe 
19 United Nations, Security Council, ‘Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the 
DR Congo’, 2 December 2011, S/2011/738, 38, 51.
20 Usalama II project interviewee #16, Mulenge, 10 May 2015.
21 Usalama II project interviewee #69, Uvira, 12 July 2015.
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Forest on the Hauts Plateaux. This created new space for armed groups. 
It also allowed the chief of the Bafuliiru to retake control of these areas, 
which he accomplished in part through the creation of local defence 
forces. 
The re-emergence of local defence forces 
Feeling betrayed by both the local population and the Congolese govern-
ment—in part because of the sudden alliance between Kinshasa and 
Kigali and subsequent military operations—and in need of resources due 
to the disruption of their former sources of income, the FDLR began to 
attack civilians. The FARDC failed to protect the population against this 
violence. This was a result of various factors, including weak command 
and control, and the challenges of securing a vast mountainous zone 
without sufficient means of transport and communication.
Exposed to FDLR retaliation and distrusting the FARDC, hundreds 
of households fled the mountains, seeking refuge in the Ruzizi Plain. 
However, cut off from their fields, their main source of livelihood, they 
soon decided to return home. A number of former Mai-Mai combatants 
took the initiative to provide basic protection to these returnees, thus 
pioneering a new wave of local defence mobilization. As one commander 
explains, ‘No person initiated this movement [local defence]. It was 
created by the suffering, the desolation, the massacres. During the Kimia 
II operations … the whole population had fled. Life in the Plain was 
expensive and the people wanted to return.’22 
In an effort to formalize this initiative, the mwami of the Bafuliiru, 
Ndare Simba Simon, approached the Kimia II command with a proposal 
to set up a system of armed defence groups controlled by the chiefdom. 
The FARDC consented to the creation of this structure on the condition 
that its members would collaborate with the military by providing intel-
ligence and scouting for them during operations. This resembles the 
arrangement between the military and the militants-combatants during 
22 Usalama II project interviewee #42, Ndolera, 14 May 2015.
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the Simba rebellion in the 1960s and the local defence forces of the RCD 
during the Second Congo War.
With the consent of the FARDC, the mwami authorized the distribu-
tion of assault rifles to the village-based local defence forces. In contrast 
to Mai-Mai groups, which stay in the bush, members of the local defence 
forces continue to live in their own homes and work as usual, as they 
carry out their security duties only on a part-time basis, in particular 
patrolling at night. Another difference with Mai-Mai groups is that the 
local defence forces, which have no specific anti-government agenda, are 
tolerated by the state security forces and often collaborate with the army 
during military operations. Many Mai-Mai groups, by contrast, declare 
themselves to be against the government and sometimes clash with the 
military, although at times they also collude with them.
A final difference between Mai-Mai and local defence groups is that 
the latter are ultimately subordinate to customary authority, although 
this does not apply to all groups. While at the village level, local defence 
forces are accountable to the chef de localité (village chief), at the level of 
the chiefdom, the commander-in-chief reports to the security council 
of the chiefdom. Up until September 2015, the commander-in-chief was 
Molière Mutulanyi, a former logistics officer in the Mai-Mai brigade of 
Kayamba, who later joined and then deserted from the FARDC, where 
he had held the rank of captain.23 
In spite of the formal command structure, in the initial years of local 
defence mobilization, it was the mwami who took all major decisions. 
Consequently, these forces increasingly served as private militia. The 
mwami also employed these groups to counterbalance the FARDC and 
minimize the military’s interference in his administration. Further-
more, in 2011, Ndare Simba attempted to use the local defence forces, 
by then renamed Forces d’autodéfense locales et légitimes (FALL, Local and 
Legitimate Self-defence Forces),24 in support of his electoral campaign. 
23 Due to leadership struggles, Molière was replaced by Kalihako Muhombo, likewise an 
ex-Mai-Mai officer in the brigade of Kayamba.
24 FALL is, however, a little known and rarely used name for the local defence forces of 
the Bafuliiru Chiefdom.
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A member of the provincial assembly since 2007, he stood as a candidate 
in the 2011 national legislative elections and mobilized the local defence 
forces to intimidate political opponents.25 Thus, although founded as 
a force for the protection of village populations, local defence groups 
ultimately became caught up in similar processes of militarization to 
those involving Mai-Mai groups. 
The rebellion of Bede Rusagara
The mwami was not alone in trying to make use of the local defence 
forces. In 2011, Bede (also known as Obedi or Bedy) Rusagara, a native 
of the village of Mutarule in the Ruzizi Plain, deserted from the FARDC. 
Returning to Uvira, he started a new armed group in the Moyens Plateaux, 
later known as the Mouvement congolais pour le changement (MCC, Congo-
lese Movement for Change).26 Hard-pressed to fill the ranks, Bede first 
attempted to recruit from the local defence forces, a substantial number 
of whom were demobilized Mai-Mai. He was also in contact with the 
Burundian FNL. 
Bede’s recruitment efforts met with limited success. Being among 
the Fuliiru Mai-Mai who joined the RCD’s local defence forces during 
the Second Congo War, Bede had remained close to ex-RCD Rwando-
phone circles ever since. Therefore, he was mistrusted among many 
Bafuliiru, who define themselves as autochthones, or indigenous to the 
area.27 Although he joined the FARDC during the transition period, Bede 
eventually left for the CNDP and then reintegrated into the army in 2009. 
He did not remain very long in the military, deserting in 2011. Bede’s 
move back to the bush was facilitated by ex-CNDP and other networks 
within the FARDC to whom he stayed closely allied and who provided 
him with munitions.28
25 Usalama II project interviewee #65, Uvira, 11 July 2015.
26 The name of his movement was later changed to Coalition des congolais pour la libération 
(CCL, Coalition of Congolese for Liberation).
27 Usalama II project interviewee #26, Rubanga, 11 May 2015.
28 United Nations, Security Council, ‘Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the 
DR Congo’, 15 November 2012, S/2012/843, 21–22.
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Bede’s continuing proximity to ex-CNDP circles became especially 
clear in 2012, when he tried to create a South Kivu offshoot of the M23, a 
North-Kivu based rebellion formed by ex-CNDP deserters. This alliance, 
and the fact that he had many Rwandophone (mostly Banyamulenge but 
also some Burundian) recruits in his ranks, estimated to total 250 troops, 
only reinforced mistrust among the Bafuliiru.29 
Yet Bede ultimately managed to build up an important position 
among Fuliiru and pro-government elites. This was the result of both 
his involvement in the conflict in the Ruzizi Plain and his strategy of 
multi-positioning, whereby he simultaneously maintained contacts with 
nominally opposed sides. As one respondent explains, ‘He [Bede] played 
a double game. He gave information about the M23 to the government, as 
he communicated at the same time with the M23 and the government.’30 
Thus, the demise of the M23 at the end of 2013 did not reduce Bede’s 
influence. In fact, he received increasing protection from politicians 
and businesspeople at both the national and provincial level, while also 
successfully liaising with local authorities. As a result, Bede became one 
of the most powerful warlords in Uvira, a position he maintained until 
his death in August 2015, when he was shot by the FARDC.31 Alleg-
edly, some of these political contacts also gave him money occasionally, 
although he generated substantial resources himself by engaging in 
banditry - cattle looting, kidnappings and ambushes-and extortion from 
minibus companies travelling through the Ruzizi Plain.32
These political connections also granted Bede de facto impunity, 
preventing him and his civilian collaborators from being apprehended 
by the security services and the military prosecutor’s office (auditorat). 
As a police commander in the Ruzizi Plain testifies, ‘Ministers [from] 
here are in permanent contact with armed group leaders. One minister 
29 UN S/2012/843, 22–23. 
30 Usalama II project interviewee #62, Bukavu, 9 July 2015. 
31 After his death, some of Bede’s combatants have continued to operate in the Ruzizi 
Plain under the leadership of a commander called ‘Tigre’.
32 Usalama II project interviewees #14, Mutarule, 14 April 2014; #37, Luberizi, 13 May 
2015. 
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even called me to say “maintain good contact with this or that armed 
group”.’33
Bede would also directly intimidate security and judicial personnel 
himself. As a military justice source affirms, ‘I was on board a car and he 
[Bede] calls me, saying “I see you passing in a car”. I even do not know 
him. But he, he knows me.’34 Such calls reveal that Bede was aware of 
the movements of security and judicial personnel and where they lived, 
attesting to the efficacy of his intelligence apparatus, which involved 
many civilians. In particular, it included numerous motards (motor-taxi 
drivers) operating in Uvira, who are well aware of people’s movements. 
As one respondent comments, ‘During the day, he is a motard but at night 
he is a Mai-Mai.’35 
Bede’s high-level political connections and extensive network of 
civilian collaborators allowed him to intervene in all sorts of disputes 
and decision-making procedures, either on his own initiative or at the 
request of one of the parties involved. For example, he was able to influ-
ence appointments in the local administration and control how land 
disputes were settled, which sometimes included intimidating personnel 
in the department of land affairs in Uvira. Believing that Bede was able 
to mobilize powerful figures, those targeted would often comply to 
avoid trouble.36 This exemplifies traffic d’influence (influence peddling), 
which is a crucial mechanism armed groups use to exert influence over 
non-military domains, a hallmark of militarization. 
33 Usalama II project interviewee #36, Luvungi, 13 May 2015.
34 Usalama II project interviewee #65, Uvira, 11 July 2015.
35 Usalama II project interviewee #65, Uvira, 11 July 2015.
36 Usalama II project interviewees #12, Bwegera, 14 April 2014; #45, Luberizi, 14 May 
2015; #62, Bukavu, 9 July 2015.
4. Customary power conflicts
In 2012, various conflicts related to customary authority resurfaced in 
Uvira. These conflicts served to strengthen armed groups in two ways. 
First, by linking themselves to one of the parties in conflict —often 
by claiming to engage in self-defence against a supposedly hostile 
community—armed groups managed to mobilize both popular and elite 
support. Second, the presence of armed groups aggravated conflicts 
over customary authority: they not only lowered the threshold for using 
violence but simultaneously sharpened the security dilemmas between 
parties in conflict. Armed groups, in turn, benefited from the increased 
demand for violence and protection.
Bad governance, or misrule, which creates motivation and space for 
contesting authority, is another factor that multiplies conflict. When 
people feel that local leaders do not live up to their expectations, for 
instance by selling communal land for personal gain, they are inclined to 
support the competitors of those leaders. This is a mutually reinforcing 
relationship, whereby those whose authority is contested are more likely 
to engage in misrule, harnessing their resources and contacts for the 
purpose of staying in power. 
Struggles over the leadership of the  
Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom
In 2012, Floribert Ndabagoye, the Rundi mwami of the Ruzizi Plain, was 
to be reinstalled in power. His reign was disputed by many Bafuliiru, 
who not only claimed the right to rule over the chiefdom but were also 
angered by his way of governing during the Second Congo War. Ndaba-
goye was suspended in 2004, when he served as a national member of 
parliament for the RCD. Meanwhile, the Ruzizi Plain had been adminis-
tered by mostly Fuliiru interim administrators, who had appointed new 
Fuliiru chefs de groupements. 
This allowed the Bafuliiru to control local political authority and access 
to land. Profiting from the ambiguous legal framework surrounding 
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land in the Congo, the interim administrators sold vast tracts of land. 
This created considerable tensions. Not only did numerous small-scale 
farmers lose access to land, it also intensified conflicts between cattle 
owners and cultivators.37 
There is major pressure on the land in the Ruzizi Plain, due in part 
to population growth and to displacement during the wars, such that 
the number of people depending on this land for their livelihoods has 
increased. Furthermore, the Ruzizi Plain’s economy never recovered 
from the blows it was dealt by economic decline during the late Mobutu 
era and the Congo Wars. The sugar refinery in Kiliba, which closed its 
doors in 1995, never restarted and rice production has not continued 
on the same scale as before.38 Against this background of poverty and 
extensive pressures on land, the stakes in control of land have become 
all the higher. This was one of the reasons why some Bafuliiru did not 
welcome the news that Rundi authority would be restored with the 
return of Chief Ndabagoye. 
In April 2012, mwami Ndabagoye visited the Ruzizi Plain in order 
to prepare the population for his renewed reign. Shortly before the 
enthronement ceremony, he was assassinated in the village of Luberizi. 
According to investigations by the military prosecutor’s office in Uvira, 
the mwami was killed by Bede Rusagara, a family relation of the acting 
administrator of the Ruzizi Plain, Bike Rusagara. Allegedly, Bede acted at 
the instigation of and in collaboration with a network of Fuliiru leaders, 
including a number of chefs de groupement in the Ruzizi Plain. However, 
none of the suspects were indicted due to political interference and a 
lack of evidence.39 
37 Justine Brabant and Jean-Louis K. Nzweve, La houe, la vache et le fusil. Conflits liés à 
la transhumance en territoires de Fizi et Uvira (Sud-Kivu, RDC): État des lieux et leçons tirées de 
l’expérience de LPI, Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute, 2013, 34–38. 
38 Didier de Failly, ‘L’économie du Sud-Kivu 1990–2000: Mutations profondes cachées 
par une panne’, in L’Afrique des Grands Lacs. Annuaire 1999–2000, eds. Stefaan Marysse and 
Filip Reyntjens, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2000, 163–192.
39 Usalama II project interviewee #65, Uvira, 11 July 2015.
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The same local authorities, aided by provincial and national-level 
Fuliiru politicians, tried to aggravate the conflict that unfolded in the 
wake of the assassination. In order to prevent Richard Nijimbere Kinyoni, 
the son of the assassinated mwami, from acceding to the throne, this 
group encouraged Fuliiru youth throughout the Ruzizi Plain to barricade 
the main road between Uvira and Bukavu. The president of the South 
Kivu Provincial Assembly, Emile Baleke Kadudu, is alleged to have played 
an important role in these events.40 According to a policeman deployed 
to the Ruzizi Plain, ‘These politicians intoxicate the youth. When they 
arrive [in the village], they give money to youngsters, including those 
smoking cannabis [mavutabangi]. … They throw parties where they give 
crates of beer and generators to play music.’41 Such mobilization draws 
upon strong anti-Rundi rhetoric. It therefore resembles how the Fuliiru 
politician Musa Marandura tried to reinforce his position in the first years 
of the Congo’s independence.
Some of the youth participating in the protests were later recruited 
into the Fuliiru local defence groups that sprang up in some parts of 
the Ruzizi Plain at this time. In part, the emergence of these groups 
was a result of severe mistrust among the Bafuliiru towards the locally 
deployed FARDC units, where Rwandophones (particularly Banyamu-
lenge) held important positions. This was believed to introduce a bias 
towards the Rwandophone Barundi, who closely collaborated with the 
Banyamulenge living in the Ruzizi Plain. Thus, the FARDC was thought 
to intervene less actively when the lives and property of the Bafuliiru 
were at risk or to their disadvantage when intervening in conflicts. 
The Bafuliiru also feared an armed group composed of a majority of 
Barundi and Banyamulenge but aided by a number of Burundian recruits, 
which was headquartered in the village of Mutarule. Created by Rundi 
customary authorities, the group was partly formed in reaction to inten-
sified activities by Fuliiru Mai-Mai groups in the Ruzizi Plain, which 
40 Usalama II project interviewees #12, Bwegera, 13 April 2014; #14, Mutarule, 14 April 
2014; #36, Luvungi, 13 May 2015.
41 Usalama II project interviewee #36, Luvungi, 13 May 2015. 
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had started to engage in massive cattle looting. This pro-Rundi group, 
however, was also looting cattle, which had become the main source of 
income for the various armed groups operating in the Ruzizi Plain. 
Following the logic of this security dilemma, the presence of the 
pro-Rundi armed group again reinforced popular and political support 
for Fuliiru Mai-Mai groups, some of which formed in this period. In 2013, 
ex-Mai-Mai officer Karakara, a native of Mutarule, who was at the time 
a captain in the FARDC, deserted from the military base of Luberizi. 
Being accused of stirring up trouble and interfering in the conflict in the 
Ruzizi Plain by his Banyamulenge regiment commander, who threatened 
to arrest him, he chose to return to the bush. This decision was further 
driven by frustrations about his lowly position in the army, which he 
attributed to the systematic favouring of Rwandophone officers.42
Support for Mai-Mai groups was further reinforced by a massacre 
in June 2014, when more than 34 people of Fuliiru descent were killed 
during an attack on Mutarule. This massacre is generally ascribed to 
the Rundi–Banyamulenge armed group based in the same village. In 
particular, the Rundi leader Sheria, who formerly served in the RCD’s 
local defence forces in the Ruzizi Plain, was alleged to have played an 
important role.43 The massacre, however, was greatly facilitated by the 
non-intervention of the FARDC. Although the locally deployed FARDC 
company tried to intervene, the battalion commander, of Banyamulenge 
origins, discouraged further efforts.44 The massacre therefore fostered 
more distrust of the national armed forces, which again increased 
support for the Mai-Mai. 
Armed violence in the Ruzizi Plain does not only pit Barundi and 
Banyamulenge against Bafuliiru. The various Fuliiru Mai-Mai groups 
in the area also compete and fight over spheres of influence and the 
42 Usalama II project interviewee #53; Luvungi, 16 May 2015. 
43 Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: Army, UN Failed to Stop Massacre. Apparent 
Ethnic attack Kills 30 Civilians, 2 July 2014. Accessed 13 January 2016, https://www.hrw.
org/news/2014/07/02/dr-congo-army-un-failed-stop-massacre.
44 United Nations, Security Council, ‘Final Report of the UN Group of Experts on the 
DR Congo’, 12 January 2015, S/2015/19, 31–32.
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division of booty. For instance, in 2014, Bede killed Karakara’s brother in 
Uvira, which led to a major fall-out between the two warlords. Hostility 
between Fuliiru Mai-Mai groups also results from liaisons with different 
Fuliiru parties to conflicts. An example is the dispute over the position 
of the village chief of Luberizi, which has set one faction allied to the 
Mai-Mai Simusizi against another linked to Karakara.45 In short, the 
emergence of Fuliiru Mai-Mai groups in the Ruzizi Plain not only aggra-
vated conflict between Bafuliiru and Barundi but also contributed to the 
militarization of conflicts between Fuliiru factions. 
Conflict over the throne in the Bafuliiru Chiefdom
Conflict in the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom is closely related to events in the 
Bafuliiru Chiefdom, as local authorities and politicians try to exploit 
frictions with the Barundi to gain support and impair opponents. This 
also applies to the mwami of the Bafuliiru, Ndare Simba, who failed to 
get elected in 2011. 
Allegedly, one reason Ndare failed was popular discontent with his 
mediocre record as a chief. A large part of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom consists 
of isolated mountainous areas, where small-scale agriculture is the main 
source of income and most people are poor. While some Bafuliiru keep 
cattle and a number of others own or work in the cassiterite mining 
pits, other economic activities are limited. Key Fuliiru businesspeople 
are mostly based in urban centres such as Uvira and Bukavu, and not in 
the chiefdom itself. Only the Itara–Luvungi groupement has a somewhat 
more diversified economy, with trade, services and real estate occupying 
important places.
Despite these unfavourable social and economic conditions, Ndare 
invested little of the chiefdom’s tax revenue in development initiatives, 
such as much-needed investments in electrification and infrastructure, or 
modernizing the administration. Rather, he used the chiefdom’s income 
mostly for private purposes and to feed his own patronage networks. As 
45 Judith Verweijen, ‘The Making of Conflict in the Eastern Congo: Trouble in the Ruzizi 
Plain’, Rift Valley Institute, Usalama Project Blog. Accessed 18 December 2015, http://
riftvalley.net/news/making-conflict-eastern-congo-trouble-ruzizi-plain#.VoOCAxFWJps.
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one respondent says, ‘When the mwami was in power… they [mwami and 
his networks] were busy exploiting cassiterite. So they built houses in 
Bukavu and Uvira, they had cars, they were busy enriching themselves, 
while the others were in poverty.’46
Deflecting attention from his own bad governance, the conflict in 
the Ruzizi Plain offered Ndare the opportunity to regain popularity and 
power. Thus, he did little to avoid an escalation of events. In December 
2012, Ndare unexpectedly died from cardiac arrest, following an unidenti-
fied illness which is widely believed to have been induced by poisoning. 
This led to the re-emergence of a long-standing conflict over power in 
the Bafuliiru Chiefdom. 
In 1977, the then mwami of the Bafuliiru, Simba Nyamugira Henri, 
stepped down from his role as acting chief, leaving this position to his 
eldest son Ndare. In 1980, Ndare left for Europe to continue his studies, 
installing his half-brother Albert Mukogabwe Muzimu-wa-Simba as the 
interim chief. In 1988, when Simba Nyamugira died, Ndare returned in 
order to be invested as mwami. This is in accordance with the Fuliiru 
customary principle that royal succession runs from father to the eldest 
son (the first-born of the first wife).
However, Ndare’s right to the throne was contested by his half-brother 
Albert. In 1989, Ndare returned to Europe for a brief period of time to 
wrap up his activities there. In his absence, Albert was invested as mwami 
by the banjoga (the Fuliiru guardians of custom). Among the Bafuliiru, 
the investment ceremony includes wearing the lushembe (royal diadem), 
which is a symbol of royal power. The fact that Albert was now in the 
possession of the lushembe therefore created considerable confusion. 
After months of conflict, Albert agreed to withdraw, leaving the throne 
to Ndare. When the latter died in December 2012, however, the conflict 
flared up again, as Albert reclaimed the throne.
Despite Albert’s claims, Ndare’s eldest son, Adam Kalingishi, was 
recognized by ministerial decree as the new customary chief. This official 
recognition did not end the conflict, though, because the pro-Albert 
46 Usalama II project interviewee #69, Uvira, 12 July 2015.
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faction contested the decision. Albert was encouraged in his opposi-
tion by several influential Fuliiru politicians and businesspeople. For 
example, in February 2014, when the lubunga organized a meeting in the 
town of Luvungi to resolve the conflict, a national member of parliament, 
Justin Bitakwira Byonahayi, openly spoke out against the lubunga’s initia-
tive in a speech broadcast on a local radio station.47 
Other politicians and businesspeople, however, supported the 
opposing side —the camp rallying behind mwami Adam and his uncle, 
Edmond Muhogo. The latter was made interim administrator of the 
chiefdom because Adam returned to Kinshasa to prepare to go and 
study in Europe. In this way, the interference of influential politicians 
hampered a solution to the conflict. It also created an additional political 
layer. While the majority of the pro-Albert camp are politicians from the 
opposition, reflecting Albert’s own sympathies for the Union pour la nation 
congolaise (UNC, Union for the Congolese Nation), those favoring Adam 
are generally from pro-government parties.
Another factor that prolonged the conflict is discontent about the 
way the new mwami and his inner circle govern the chiefdom. They 
are accused of mishandling the chiefdom’s finances, partly under the 
influence of Ndare’s former advisor Jean-Marie Kagombe. Little of the 
rétrocession (the percentage of national tax revenues that is returned to 
the lower-level administrative entities where the taxes are levied) is 
invested in the chiefdom. As a leader of the Fuliiru mutuelle (self-help–
social insurance association) asserts, ‘There is around USD 15,000 dollar 
rétrocession a month but much of this is embezzled.’48 In contrast, Albert 
is known among his partisans as icône or père du développement (icon or 
father of development), reflecting his more positive contribution to the 
development of the chiefdom.49
47 Usalama II project interviewee #69, Uvira, 12 July 2015.
48 Usalama II project interviewee #60, Bukavu, 8 July 2015.
49 Centre Indépendant de Recherches et d’Études Stratégiques au Kivu (CIRESKI), Du 
conflit dans la dynastie Hamba chez les Bafuliru, Uvira: CIRESKI, 2014. 
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Correcting weak performance of the chiefdom has proven difficult, as 
local administrative authorities have a limited grip on the mwami. The 
presence of local defence forces has further tipped the balance of power 
to the advantage of the customary leaders, since administrative authori-
ties may be put under pressure by these forces. 
The conflict over succession to the throne of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom 
has politicized the local defence forces, which has complicated their 
role in shoring up customary power. Given that Molière, the previous 
commander-in-chief, was firmly in the mwami Adam camp, obeying his 
orders became a political act. Consequently, local defence commanders 
preferring to stay neutral or harbouring sympathies for Albert tried 
to distance themselves from Molière’s command. This undermined 
centralized command and control, rendering local commanders more 
autonomous and susceptible to manipulation by local interests, which 
in some cases has led to misconduct. 
5. The militarization of local governance 
There are mutually reinforcing relations between bad governance, armed 
mobilization and conflicts: by liaising with armed groups, incompetent 
authorities manage to shore up their power and use coercion. This 
exacerbates or creates conflicts, as local authorities inflate existing differ-
ences to deflect attention. It also gives rise to discontent and grievances 
among local populations. Conversely, armed groups seize upon conflicts 
related to local authority by rallying behind one of the parties in conflict 
to reinforce their legitimacy and power. The governance component of 
this vicious circle can be further explored by focusing on two domains: 
security governance and economic regulation.
Local defence forces: a double-edged sword
In addition to the state security services, the presence of a large number 
of armed groups and local defence forces in Uvira has created a convo-
luted security universe. The boundaries between these factions tend 
to be fluid, in part because everyone knows everyone else personally, 
often being relatives and extended family members, former classmates, 
ex-Mai-Mai comrades or neighbours. 
Local defence forces and Mai-Mai are therefore closely interwoven 
with the local population. These dense linkages contribute to the milita-
rization of governance because local authorities and inhabitants befriend 
armed groups and solicit their intervention in conflicts, to exert pressure 
on competitors and settle personal scores. These close ties also hinder 
the accountability of men and women with guns, as civilians withhold 
information from state security personnel and officers of the law. This 
has further complicated security provision, which is already impeded by 
the overall meagre performance of the army and police. The resulting 
insecurity reinforces and further justifies local defence measures. 
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Local defence forces are present in large parts of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom, 
especially in isolated mountain areas.50 While there are no reliable 
estimates, Molière is said to have claimed that in mid-2014 they roughly 
constituted a brigade, with approximately 3,000 to 4,000 members 
scattered throughout the chiefdom.51 While these groups are collectively 
known as local defence forces (popularly called balala rondo), they vary 
considerably in terms of their organization, behavior and relations to 
authorities and other armed forces. One reason for these differences is 
that the local defence forces are not a unified movement commanded by 
the chiefdom. Whereas some commanders obey the orders of Molière 
(or his successor), others act autonomously. 
In some areas, local defence forces resemble a miniature army, with 
roughly similar structures and nomenclature. For instance, on the Ndolera 
axis (in the groupement of Itara–Luvungi), ‘Lieutenant Colonel’ Prospèr 
Mahinduzi, a former intelligence officer in the Mai-Mai of Kayamba, acts 
as brigade commander. He oversees battalions and companies stationed 
in different villages, which are headed by commanders assisted by an état-
major (general staff) with ranks and functions similar to that of the army, 
such as intelligence (S2) and operations (S3). In the words of one local 
defence commander: ‘When there is already the presence of an army, 
you need the structure of an army, otherwise you cannot function.’52 
Commanders wear parts of FARDC uniforms and often have two-way 
radios. Commenting on why they dress in army uniforms, the same 
commander says, ‘No, I am not of the government. But I do wear the 
uniform. When you are a fan of Mazembe [popular football club], you 
wear the uniform of Mazembe.’53 
However, not all local defence forces are organized this way. On the 
Mulenge axis, for example, where the local defence forces operate under 
50 The local defence forces operating in the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom were suspended by 
the FARDC in 2013. Note that there are also local defence forces in the neighbouring 
Bavira Chiefdom.
51 Usalama II project interviewee #94, Lemera, 23 September 2015. 
52 Usalama II project interviewee #42, Ndolera, 14 May 2015.
53 Usalama II project interviewee #42, Ndolera, 14 May 2015.
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the overall command of Ngengwe Masabire, the village chief of Mulenge 
1, they simply have one commander per village, who is assisted in each 
avenue (quarter) by a deputy and secretary. These forces generally do not 
wear military uniforms. As a commander explains, ‘These are civilians. 
These are not soldiers.’54 
Even where organization is structured along military lines, local 
defence forces generally remain subordinate to local customary authority. 
At the battalion level, village chiefs are considered to have the function 
of chef d’état-major (chief of the general staff). Many of these chiefs are 
former Mai-Mai and therefore have military experience. They often use 
local defence groups to reinforce their own position, for instance to 
execute decisions or neutralize opponents. In some cases, village chiefs 
also assist with arranging the dawa ya asili (customary medicine for spiri-
tual protection on the battlefield) that most local defence groups use, 
similar to the Mai-Mai.
Local chiefs and other leaders also play a key role in organizing 
community contributions to the local defence forces, such as maize or 
manioc flour, or batteries for torches used during nightly patrols. These 
contributions are collected from households, local businesses (e.g. flour 
mills), road barriers and markets. While local defence members are often 
described as bavoluntaires (volunteers), they do not operate entirely at 
their own expense but are generally given food before going on patrol. 
Commanders and officers may also be given a motivation (a financial 
inducement); for example, the commander-in-chief is reported to receive 
a percentage of the chiefdom’s tax revenues. In the past, the local defence 
forces also operated a cassiterite mining pit in Lemera, donated by the 
chiefdom.
People who live in isolated mountain villages in particular do not see 
these contributions as problematic, as they feel that the local defence 
forces increase their security. Not only are these forces more numerous 
and more effective than the army and police, they are also considered to 
have closer ties to the local population. Many people referred to them as 
54 Usalama II project interviewee #21, Mugule, 10 May 2015.
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batoto ya hapa (children from here), in contrast to the batokambali (those 
coming from far) of the state security services. 
The necessity of local defence presence was particularly highlighted 
in areas where the population feared revenge actions by the FDLR in the 
wake of the Sokola (Clean Up) II army operations launched in January 
2015. Having returned to the Moyens Plateaux in 2013 after previous 
military operations had ended, the FDLR were again forced to withdraw. 
During the Sokola II operations, the army used the local defence forces 
as guides and to collect intelligence. In the course of this action, some 
members were wounded or lost their lives.55 Such active collaboration 
with the FARDC has generated deep fears that once the FDLR returns, 
they will take revenge on the population. 
This is especially the case where local defence forces have been 
disbanded at the instigation of the FARDC, which received orders from 
the military hierarchy to convince them to disarm, as in the area of 
Mubere. According to a village chief in this area, ‘The FDLR are not far 
from here and we fear that they will return. There are no longer any local 
defence forces. … We are afraid that the FDLR will take revenge and will 
accuse us of having shown the fields of the FDLR [to the FARDC, which 
subsequently destroyed them].’56
Despite the fact that people generally feel safer with a local defence 
presence, many also reported problems with these forces. As one respon-
dent highlights, the local defence forces are a ‘double-edged sword’, 
bringing both security and insecurity.57 In some villages, parts of the 
forces collaborate with bandits or armed groups, for example in the 
trade in stolen cattle from the Ruzizi Plain.58 Local defence forces are 
also often drawn into local conflicts, with people attempting to mobilize 
them to settle scores and regulate conflicts, frequently related to issues 
55 Usalama II project interviewees #19, Mulenge, 10 May 2015; #25 and #27, Rubanga, 11 
May 2015; #46, Lubarika, 15 May 2015.
56 Usalama II project interviewee #18, Kihinga, 10 May 2015.
57 Usalama II project interviewee #60, Bukavu, 8 July 2015.
58 Usalama II project interviewees #34, 13 May 2015; #26, Rubanga, 11 May 2015.
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such as debt, family matters, love affairs, land and other property. In the 
village of Mugogo, for instance, local defence forces protected the owners 
of a contested land concession, allowing them to cultivate the land by 
preventing the farmers who had been expelled from reoccupying it. Local 
defence forces have also been implicated in assassinations and killings of 
suspected sorcerers, acting as guns for hire.59 As such, they contribute to 
processes of militarization at the village level, enabling people to appeal 
to armed groups for various forms of social regulation and to further 
personal interests. 
By intervening in conflicts and other cases where people feel disad-
vantaged or aggrieved (for example, as a result of crime), local defence 
forces often interfere with the work of the Police nationale congolaise 
(PNC, National Congolese Police). Indeed, they sometimes replace the 
police, arresting and fining people, and having their own prisons. As a 
police officer explains, ‘In 2013, we, PNC, we had no authority over the 
local defence because they were supported by the people from the bush 
[armed groups], so we could do nothing out of fear for being killed.’60 
Police officers in another village, calling the local defence force ‘a parallel 
administration’, felt similarly intimidated: ‘When we arrest persons, 
the local defence and the notable [village chief] come to withdraw them 
from our prison. … The inhabitants of this village are held hostage.’61 
He ended by saying, ‘In this chiefdom, one cannot criticize the local 
defence. The person who criticizes will be killed and there will not be 
any investigation.’62 
These narratives should be read with care. While police personnel 
readily accuse local defence forces, their own track record is sometimes 
equally poor. Both local defence forces and many villagers criticized the 
police for being inefficient and for arbitrary arrests and fines. Nevertheless, 
these stories indicate that in many places the power relations between 
59 Usalama II project interviewees #15, Lemera, 9 May 2015; #30, Lemera, 12 May 2015.
60 Usalama II project interviewee #34, 13 May 2015.
61 Usalama II project interviewee #47, 15 May 2015.
62 Usalama II project interviewee #47, 15 May 2015.
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these groups and the PNC are asymmetrical. The PNC is often outnum-
bered by local defence forces, which also have more arms. Although the 
chiefdom distributed only a limited number of weapons when these 
groups were created, most local defence forces have augmented their 
arsenals over time. Many have bought arms from the FDLR, while others 
have been allowed to keep the arms of enemy forces found on the battle-
field when helping the FARDC during military operations.63 
Such power asymmetries clearly impede processes for holding local 
defence forces to account. When committing infractions or crimes, 
members of these forces often try to avoid being apprehended and inter-
rogated by the PNC or the military prosecutor’s office. They may hide 
among the population, sometimes with the help of local authorities, or 
directly intimidate security and justice personnel. As a military source 
confides, ‘I can go to Lemera [to arrest a local defence member] but at 
the level of the escarpements [mountain slopes] I will be ambushed.’64 
These problems with accountability are exacerbated by the ambiguous 
legal status of the local defence forces. Given that they were created with 
the benediction of the FARDC, in their own perception these forces are 
official. As one local defence commander comments, ‘I am a government 
man [mutu wa l’état]. These arms are from the state.’65 The police and 
military, however, emphasize that these forces have no clear legal status. 
One police officer asserts, ‘The local defence forces operate clandestinely, 
they are not recognized by the state.’66 Similarly, a military commander 
in Lemera explains, ‘We see them currently as armed groups. We have 
received orders that when we see them with arms, we need to disarm 
them.’67
The complex relations between the local defence forces and PNC 
illustrate a wider problem surrounding governance within the Bafuliiru 
63 Usalama II project interviewees #25 and #27, Rubanga, 11 May 2015; #46, Lubarika, 15 
May 2015.
64 Usalama II project interviewee #65, Uvira, 11 July 2015.
65 Usalama II project interviewee #19, Mulenge I, 10 May 2015.
66 Usalama II project interviewee #34, 13 May 2015.
67 Usalama II project interviewee #32, Lemera, 12 May 2015.
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Chiefdom, namely, the tensions between customary leaders and the local 
administrative authorities. Customary leaders generally try to minimize 
the latter’s power, for example by not complying with relevant rules and 
regulations or by trying to influence decisions to their own benefit. The 
fact that customary authorities can make use of local defence forces has 
only reinforced their positions vis-à-vis the local administration.
The subtleties of militarized mining
Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, militarization in the economic 
domain is not only manifested in direct interventions of armed forces in 
revenue-generation activities. It also takes on more subtle and indirect 
forms, whereby civilian businesspeople and leaders mobilize armed 
groups to intimidate economic competitors, ward off potential interfer-
ence by local authorities and help stifle popular protest (against the sale 
of land or prices perceived as unjust for instance). A telling example is 
the way in which customary authorities in Lemera have drawn upon 
local defence forces—mostly in an indirect manner—to strengthen 
their authority in the domain of minerals extraction, which has created 
frictions with the local administration.
Until 2010, the management of the cassiterite sector was entirely 
in the hands of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom. Thus, it was the mwami who 
distributed mining concessions, in exchange for the payment of the itulo 
(customary tax), estimated to be around USD 450–500 per pit.68 The 
chiefdom also imposed relatively heavy taxation on pits in production, 
demanding approximately one day of production per month and one sack 
of cassiterite per pit per day. 
The chiefdom’s monopoly on the regulation of the mining sector led 
to various types of bad practices, in particular influence peddling. Those 
having a favoured status with the mwami were disproportionately advan-
taged, while others were treated in an arbitrary manner. Such favouritism 
was also reflected in the composition of the comité des creuseurs (the 
committee of the chiefdom charged with supervising mining affairs). 
68 Usalama II project interviewee #1, Lemera, 31 October 2011. 
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The latter consisted only of the mwami’s confidantes, such as Molière, 
the commander-in-chief of the local defence forces, and the president 
of the chiefdom’s comité des sages (committee of the wise), Quinquina. 
The mwami also protected people who tried illegally to dispossess 
others under whose lands cassiterite was found. An example is a conces-
sion of seven hectares at the site of Kigunga, a case the owners took 
to court in Uvira. The mwami and his entourage having initially tried 
to obstruct the case by mobilizing local defence members to protect 
suspects summoned by the court, the judge eventually decided in favour 
of the original occupants.69 
The strong grip of the chiefdom on cassiterite mining created signifi-
cant friction with the mining officials sent to Lemera in 2010 to regulate 
the sector in accordance with relevant legislation. These national officials 
were tasked with delimiting mining concessions and registering pit 
owners. At this time, these concessions, and their owners and managers, 
the PDGs (président-directeur general, or chief executive officer) had only 
been registered by the chiefdom, implying that they did not pay taxes to 
the national authorities. The chiefdom did not cooperate and partially 
obstructed the implementation of these measures, continuing to exercise 
de facto control.70 
Another manifestation of the continuing influence of the chiefdom over 
the mining sector is the agreement that Ndare made with the Bukavu-
based businessman Olive Mudekereza Namegabe in 2012. The latter 
obtained the concession to the two main mining sites in Lemera–Kigunga 
and Mugerero (see Map 2), apparently in exchange for guaranteeing the 
chiefdom a measure of control, such as the right to appoint members 
to the mining committee, who are paid on a monthly basis by Olive.71 
This new set-up was coupled with the introduction of a traceability 
scheme initiated by iTSCi (the International Tin Research Institute Tin 
Supply Chain Initiative). The scheme was developed in response to 
69 Usalama II project interviewee #29, Lemera, 11 May 2015.
70 Usalama II project interviewee #1, Lemera, 31 October 2011.
71 Usalama II project interviewees #29, Lemera, 11 May 2015; #59, Bukavu, 7 July 2015.
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growing pressure from international advocacy groups for measures to 
address the issue of conflict minerals, which were believed to fuel the 
war in the eastern Congo.72 The scheme is based on a closed pipeline 
system, allowing minerals to be traced back to their source. Barcode tags 
are attached to sacks of minerals and checked at various stages along the 
commodity chain. The origin of the minerals has to be a mining site that 
has been validated as conflict free (i.e. with no presence or influence of 
armed forces), as determined by a governance assessment conducted by 
a third-party auditor. 
The slump in the world market price for tin,73 the fact that Olive had 
obtained a monopoly, the implementation of the traceability scheme,74 
and reduced demand for minerals from the Congo,75 all contributed to 
a steady drop in cassiterite prices in Lemera. While in 2010 the ore sold 
for USD 8 per kilo, in May 2015 the price had fallen under USD 2.5 per 
kilo. This led to a decline in production and reduced the number of PDGs 
and artisanal miners. 
Local mining interests primarily blame Olive, who is the most visible 
figure in the sector, for the decline in production and prices. In turn, 
72 The introduction of the traceability scheme facilitates compliance with section 1502 
of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act adopted in 2010, 
which requires companies listed on the US stock exchange to provide assurances that the 
products they have manufactured or contracted to manufacture do not contain minerals 
‘that directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups’ in the Congo or neighbouring 
countries. See Jeroen Cuvelier et al., ‘Analyzing the Impact of the Dodd–Frank Act on 
Congolese Livelihoods’, New York: Social Science Research Council, 2014, 1. 
73 The world market price for tin peaked in April 2011, declining starkly (more than 50 
per cent) over the next four years, largely as a result of growing supplies from Myanmar 
and China. See: Yoga Rusmana and Dwi Sadmoko, ‘World Biggest Tin Exporter Cuts 
Output After Price Rout’, Bloomberg, 22 April 2015. Accessed 13 January 2016, http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-22/world-s-biggest-tin-exporter-cuts-output-after-
price-rout.
74 The traceability scheme has reinforced buyer-end regulation of the market and 
devolves the overall costs to lower levels of the supply chain. See: Ben Radley and 
Christoph Vogel, ‘Fighting windmills in Eastern Congo? The ambiguous impact of the 
“conflict minerals” movement’, The Extractive Industries and Society, 2/3, (2015), 406–10.
75 The adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, which was explained in footnote 72, led to a 
dwindling demand for minerals from the Congo.
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this has created hostility towards the new management. The fact that 
the mwami never consulted with the PDGs and artisanal miners before 
consenting to the arrangement with Olive further aggravates hostili-
ties, as miners feel the new management structure has been imposed 
upon them. Moreover, under the new structure, négociants (local mineral 
traders) were forced to stop their activities. Since these traders are also 
purveyors of loans, this has created problems for local businesses.76 
Another factor contributing to this antagonism is the politicization of 
the mining committee. Recall that in 2012, a long-term conflict over succes-
sion to the throne of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom re-ignited when Ndare died 
and his son Adam was subsequently enthroned. This prompted Ndare’s 
half-brother Albert once again to contest the chiefdom’s leadership, as he 
had done in 1989 and 1990. Since the overwhelming majority of mining 
committee members are supporters of mwami Adam, collaborating with 
the committee has become a political act. Thus, the pro-Albert faction 
has distanced itself from the mining sector, in part because they feel 
disadvantaged by the committee. For instance, when Olive provided 
money and tools to support the work of the PDGs, the mining committee 
was alleged to have favoured the pro-Adam faction in the distribution.77 
The impression of partisanship is further reinforced by the close 
links between the mining committee and the chiefdom-controlled local 
defence forces, whose leadership is firmly allied to the pro-Adam side. 
When the new mining governance structure was implemented, the local 
defence forces continued to provide security in mining areas, although 
not at the mining sites themselves, where security provision remained 
in the hands of the mining committee. The mining committee, however, 
collaborates closely with the local defence forces, which also provide 
security to Olive’s company’s installations and property, including its 
mineral depot. 
The close involvement of the local defence forces, along with the 
tight links between its leadership and the mining committee, clearly 
76 Usalama II project interviewees #23 and #29, Lemera, 11 May 2015.
77 Usalama II project interviewee #22, Lemera, 11 May 2015.
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jeopardize the conflict-free status of the mines in Lemera. This is all the 
more so since members of the local defence leadership have interests in 
the mining sector, including Molière, the former commander-in-chief of 
the local defence forces. Molière used to own a pit and supervised the 
pit that the chiefdom allocated to the local defence forces (the conces-
sion for it now seems to have been withdrawn). Some sources report 
that Molière no longer officially holds the concession to his pit, but it is 
generally recognized that he continues to have interests in the mining 
sector, working via intermediaries.78
The close ties between the mining committee and the local defence 
forces have stifled popular protest against Olive.79 This creates a 
dangerous situation, as it might prompt those opposed to the current 
state of affairs to see violence as a more viable form of protest. In April 
2015, for example, one of Olive’s representatives who regularly visits 
Lemera was ambushed, managing to escape before his assailants could 
kill him. Many believe this attack was not merely banditry but rather 
designed to communicate a message of discontent with the current situa-
tion by those working in the mineral sector.80
The local defence forces have also continued to be involved in securing 
two of three mining sites in Luvungi; namely, Mukambo and Kinyinya, 
located in the Moyens Plateaux (see Map 2). Although claiming not to 
enter these sites, the local defence force headquartered in Lupango is 
the principal security force in this area.81 Officially, the mining police 
in Katogota and the PNC in Lubarika are responsible for patrolling the 
mining sites but they rarely appear, in part due to a lack of means and 
funds for transport.82 Moreover, according to the Lubarika police, the 
Lupango local defence forces do not collaborate much with them.83 
78 Usalama II project interviewee #129, Lemera, 24 September 2015.
79 Usalama II project interviewee # 29, Lemera, 11 May 2015.
80 Usalama II project interviewee #22, Lemera, 11 May 2015.
81 Usalama II project interviewee #48, Lupango, 15 May 2015.
82 At the end of 2015, the mining police in Katogota were redeployed to Kamanyola.
83 Usalama II project interviewee #47, 15 May 2015.
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It is perhaps understandable that, in the absence of sufficient state 
security personnel, local defence forces provide security around mining 
sites. Nonetheless this opens up risks of influence peddling via allied 
PDGs and customary authorities, who remain closely linked to the local 
defence forces. Furthermore, it might impede the holding to account of 
those providing security to mineral sites for infractions and misbehaviour. 
Militarization is a process that does not always involve direct and 
overt armed group involvement. It is also about indirect and covert 
involvement via general spheres of influence and threats of, rather than 
actual, violence. Thus, demilitarizing the mineral sector requires a more 
comprehensive process than the mere physical removal of armed forces 
from the vicinity of mining sites. 
6. Conclusions and policy considerations
There is a close relationship between armed groups, local conflicts 
and local governance in the Bafuliiru and Ruzizi Plain Chiefdoms. This 
relationship drives and is driven by militarization, that is, an elevated 
role—directly and indirectly—for armed forces and coercion within 
civilian domains. Militarization is not only the outcome of the one-sided 
imposition of armed forces on civilian processes. It is also driven by 
the practices of civilians, who liaise with armed forces for a number of 
reasons such as political and economic gain, prevailing in local conflicts 
and protection in case of threats and insecurity. 
National and provincial politicians and businesspeople may harness 
armed groups to stir up trouble and harm competitors. They may also 
support such groups because they sympathize with specific worldviews, 
such as anti-Rwandophone or anti-government ideas. Similarly, local 
authorities and parts of the citizenry liaise with armed groups, including 
local defence forces, to enhance their power and settle personal scores. 
Additionally, they may approach such groups because they fear for their 
safety or because they have links via personal ties or family relations. 
Thus, armed groups in Uvira have extensive networks of civilian collabo-
rators and political protectors, who are crucial for their operation. They 
may provide intelligence, put pressure on local authorities, enable armed 
groups’ revenue-generation schemes and prevent their members from 
being apprehended or persecuted.
In sum, armed groups are the product of a diverse range of interests 
and dynamics. Their mobilization is on the one hand driven by national 
and regional developments and groups, such as foreign and foreign-
backed rebel forces, and the policies of the national army, including 
military operations and rebel integration. On the other hand, armed 
mobilization is fuelled by more local dynamics, such as conflicts around 
customary authority or between communities. 
The presence of armed groups in turn aggravates local conflicts 
and renders them violent, when for example parties in conflict seek 
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the protection of armed groups against their opponents. Moreover, for 
local government officials, the presence of allied armed groups increases 
incentives to resort to coercion and influence peddling. This also applies 
to customary authorities when they seek to counter the influence of the 
local government. The resulting poor governance is, in turn, a source of 
conflict because it invites competitors to discredit those authorities and 
helps them gain the support of discontented populations. In sum, there 
is a vicious circle of bad governance, conflict and armed mobilization that 
derives from and feeds processes of militarization. 
What then might be done to end this vicious circle and reduce the 
influence of armed groups on civilian spheres of life? Since militariza-
tion is the result of multiple factors, demilitarization is necessarily going 
to be complicated. The concluding remarks below are limited to three 
pertinent issues: conflicts involving customary authority; the linkages 
between armed groups and civilians; and the involvement of local defence 
forces in the provision of local security. 
Mitigating conflicts involving customary authority
Customary authority is a significant source of conflict in Uvira. The 
contested leadership of the Ruzizi Plain Chiefdom and the conflict over 
succession to the throne in the Bafuliiru Chiefdom have deeply destabi-
lized the area. This has been exacerbated by problems with the quality 
of customary governance—chiefs misappropriating funds, abusing their 
powers and obstructing the local administration. 
In 2012, Kinshasa proposed to simultaneously transform all three 
chiefdoms in Uvira into secteurs (entities not ruled by chiefs). While this 
may be a solution in the long term, it appears difficult to implement in 
the short term. The present dynasties are not willing to give up their 
rights and the population is heavily divided on the issue. Abolishing 
the chiefdoms in the current situation therefore risks creating yet more 
instability. 
One way forward might be through the opportunities offered by the 
decentralization process, in particular the elected councils to be installed 
at the level of chiefdoms after the local elections, to assist and control the 
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mwami. If well instructed and resourced, these councils could introduce 
more checks and balances into the system of customary governance. 
There is a risk, however, that the same mechanisms of political protec-
tion and manipulation of armed groups which have damaged customary 
authorities might also undermine the functioning of the local councils. 
Therefore, higher authorities—such as the Ministry of the Interior, which 
has Customary Affairs in its portfolio—should play a more active role 
in monitoring customary authorities and mitigating conflicts related to 
their powers by, for example, suspending chiefs who do not govern well 
and holding interfering political elites to account. 
Addressing civilian support to armed groups
Any effort to demobilize armed groups sustainably must address their 
civilian support networks—be they national politicians, local authori-
ties or grassroots supporters. This should not only take the form of 
prosecution but could also consist of social and moral pressure, through 
documentation, dialogue, admonitions and ‘naming and shaming’. 
International bodies, such as the UN peacekeeping mission in the 
Congo, could also play a role in holding civilian supporters of armed 
groups to account. They could, for example, signal awareness of their 
involvement in destabilization. Too often, politicians known for their 
support to armed groups or for aggravating conflicts are welcomed as 
peacemakers in externally-sponsored peacebuilding activities, and their 
own role in conflict glossed over. While overt confrontation or exclusion 
might not be an effective way to induce such people to change their 
behaviour, a more critical approach should be considered. 
Regulating local defence forces and reform of  
the security sector
Rampant insecurity, which is partly caused by the failure of state security 
services to protect the population, has led to the creation of armed, 
village-based local defence forces. Despite their generally positive contri-
bution to security, local defence forces remain problematic. They may 
interfere in the work of the police, be involved in settling of scores, 
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aggravate local conflicts, or collaborate with bandits and Mai-Mai groups. 
Therefore, it would help to reinforce supervision of these forces, for 
example, by addressing their unclear legal status and putting in place a 
regulatory framework for their activities.
In the long term, disbanding these groups would seem to be the best 
solution, but this is difficult to achieve in the short term. For example, 
the national security services decided to try to suspend the local defence 
forces after the Sokola II operations, giving individual combatants the 
option either to disarm and demobilize or join the PNC or the FARDC by 
going through the regular recruitment process. Until now, little progress 
has been made with this initiative. Few local defence force members have 
shown interest in joining the army or the police, believing that the condi-
tions in the security services are too bad to enrol. Furthermore, when 
they have heard about possible efforts to disarm them, many local defence 
groups have simply hidden their weapons. And where security threats 
are perceived to be strong, for instance where the FDLR is expected to 
return, such groups have simply refused to disarm.
As some local defence commanders have asserted, it is only when 
enough disciplined and well-behaved members of the security services 
are deployed that they would be willing to suspend their activities.84 In 
the face of slow progress with security sector reform, this is unlikely to 
happen in the short term. The challenges of army reform in particular 
continue to be substantial, and the sustained financial and political 
commitment it needs from both the Congolese government and inter-
national donors has not been evident.85 Consequently, villagers are likely 
to continue to fend for themselves when it comes to security provision, 
navigating the complex landscape of state and non-state armed forces 
which bring both security and insecurity. 
84 Usalama II project interviewees #42, Ndolera, 14 May 2015; #46, Lubarika, 15 May 2015.
85 For further discussion on army reform, see: Stearns et al., The National Army and Armed 
Groups.
Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases
AFDL  Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du 
Congo–Zaïre (Democratic Allied Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo–Zaire)
Amani Leo (Kiswahili) Peace Today. A series of military 
operations between January 2010 and April 2012, 
known first as Kimia II
cassiterite a mineral, tin dioxide, the main ore of tin
CNDP Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (National 
Congress for the Defence of the People)
comité des sages committee of the wise of the Bafuliiru Chiefdom 
based in Lemera; to be distinguished from the 
council of the wise (see lubunga)
FARDC Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo 
(Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo)
FDLR Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
(Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda).
FNL Forces nationales de libération (National Liberation 
Forces)
groupement a subdivision of a chiefdom governed by a 
customary chief appointed by the mwami
iTSCi International Tin Research Institute Tin Supply 
Chain Initiative
Kimia II (Kiswahili) Silence. Name for Kivus-wide military 
operations against armed groups conducted 
between March and December 2009
localité village, a subdivision of a groupement ruled over by a 
customary chief
lubunga council of the wise of the Bafuliiru people, based in 
Uvira 
militants-combatants  auxiliaries fighting on the side of the Congolese 
army against the Simba rebellion in the 1960s
M23 Mouvement du 23 mars (March 23 Movement)
mwami customary chief; can refer to paramount or lower 
level customary chiefs 
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PDG  président-directeur général (Chief Executive Officer), 
designation for owner or manager of artisanal 
mining pit
PNC Police nationale congolaise (Congolese National Police) 
RCD  Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Congolese 
Rally for Democracy)
rétrocession  a percentage of national tax revenues granted to the 
administrative entities where the taxes are levied
Sokola II (Kiswahili) Clean up. Name for military operations 
launched in January 2015
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The dramas and conflicts in the Kivus are 
chronic; they seem perpetual, even inexorable.  
But by studying ever closer daily life in this  
part of the country, the research of the Usalama 
Project opens the way to new knowledge and 
gives hope by doing so.  
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